THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED PROVINCES,

In the reſtitution of the

KING

Of

ENGLAND:

Declared upon occaſion of the preſent Warr with the English REBELLS.

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The INTREST *of the* UNITED PROVINCES *in the reſtitution of the* KING *of* ENGLAND: *Declared upon occaſion of their preſent* VVarr *with the* English Rebells.

I will not medle with the queſtion, how farr Princes and States are bound to ſuccour their oppreſt Neighbours, or to proſecute with Warre the Enemies of Religion, Gouvernment, and humane Society: which may receive a different ſolution according to the variety of circumſtances, and the condition of their owne Affaires: But this may be laid for a ground; that the concurrence of any to the confirmation of the uſurped power of ſuch perſons, muſt be very unlawfull to Chriſtians. Among civill Heathens, not only ſacriledge againſt their Gods, but Injuſtice againſt their Neighbours were the ſole occaſion of divers great warrs, as we find related by Hiſtorians; they holding themſelves bound, without reaſon of State, to the vindication of Prophanation, and releife of the oppreſſed: And it were to be wiſhed, that here in Chriſtians were not behinde them, having more apparant obligations by divine revelation, then thoſe Heathens by light of nature: And it frequently falls out, that while men looke only at home to their owne Commodity, and neglect the Calamity of their Neighbours, and thinke, prudence directs them to their owne good, and to overſee the conſiderations of Piety, and Charity, they derive the ſame evill upon themſelves, which they ſecurely permitted to be exerciſed on others. The greatſt ſcourges of the world have ariſen from ſuch ſecurity, while Princes and States reſpected not the growth of ſome deſperate lewde perſons by the ruyn of their Neighbours. The Saracens, (and ſince the Turke) are in moſt mens knowledge. And the ſupine neglect of Princes, that introduced the ſuffrings of Chriſtendome; and their owne ruyn in thoſe times, by the growth of ſuch Deſtroyers, are better remembred then remedyed. It's now evident to moſt Princes and States, that it hath beene more agreable to

Religion, Iuſtice and Prudence, that they had vigorouſly acted in ſuppreſſing the English Rebellion, and the effects of it are worſe upon themſelves, then they foreſaw: eſpecially upon the *States* of the low Countryes, who now diſcerne, that by this uſurped Ariſtocraticall power of a few, the ancient nationall affection between the Dutch and Engliſh is quite aboliſhed, in aſmuch as reſpects the governing Party in England; and the Intereſt of Trade ſo farr proſecuted, that the now Engliſh Rulers take it for graunted, that their new power in England cannot continue, unles the Dutch be their Vaſſalls, and that it is impoſſible they ſhould have a Trade proportionable to their new modelled State, while the Dutch enjoy the former freedome of Trade, they had with the Monarchy: And none, that looke into the Actions of the Engliſh Rebells, can conceive the warr begun by them proceeded from private choller or animoſity, without predeſigne upon reaſon of State, if eyther the ſtrength of each be conſidered, or the councells that their condition muſt ſuggeſt to them: Firſt the Engliſh conſider, that all Trade to the South and Weſt muſt be more difficult to the Dutch then the Engliſh, the paſſage being through the narrow Seas, where the Engliſh have ſo great advantages by their naturall ſituation, and wil be able to Trade with leſſe danger, and with leſſe charge annoy the Trade of the Dutch; then they can ſecure it: for the Engliſh Harbours give them the opportunity of all advantages to fight, or forbeare. The Engliſh can better ſuffer a diminution of Trade, in regard of the largenes of their Territory, and a greater ſtore of all neceſſaries within the land: And the exceſſive charge which the Dutch muſt be at to ſecure their Trade will eate it up. Upon theſe grounds the Engliſh Rebells found themſelves, that the iſſue of the warr muſt be to their advantage. That it is neceſſary for them to have a warr, not only to gayne a power over the Dutch, but to ſecure themſelves; for they muſt of neceſſity keepe an Army, & a Fleete on foote, ruling now by force, without right by any law Divine, or humane, a people wholy diſaffected to their power, and to be kept under only by a Rod of Iron. They diſcerne their Fleete cannot be maintained by themſelves, but by the pillage of the Dutch, who they intend ſhall bear their charges, there being no Nation els, that they can with more opportunity ſerve themſelves of in that kinde, the Spaniſh Trade being not yet to be given over by the Engliſh, which is the chiefeſt that is left their Marchants, and the French being of farr leſſe importance to them, then the Dutch. Theſe conſiderations overweigh with thoſe Rebells, that

that apprehend their ſtrength by Sea, and Land, and the Victories, and Military inclination of their Armies, all thoughts of the opportunities, that the Dutch can give to breake their power. The warr being begun, and upon theſe grounds, I dare not adviſe, but give you my conceptions, wherin I ſhall not diſſent from the common opinion, that the moſt probable way, to preſerve the low Countryes, and to make the warr ſhort, and proſperous, is to declare for the Intereſt of the *King* of England: And though this way maylooke like a motion proceeding from the affection of a Loyall Engliſhman towards his Prince, yet it, will appeare to be drawne from reaſons of the Dutch condition. Firſt take the buſineſſe in generall as it is a State of warr, all meanes poſſible are to be uſed to diſunite the Ennemy, and contract all Alliances poſſible for defence: And touching the firſt, there is no meanes ſo prevalent to diſunite the Engliſh, and to divert their forces, as the Dutch to declare for the *King*: for as all thoſe in His three Kingdomes, that have Loyalty left, will contribute all they can to the *King*: and to ſuch Princes and States as aſſiſt Him: ſo many newtrall, and indifferent perſons, in thoſe Kingdomes, will not then account the warr a nationall quarrell, as yet they underſtand it, but the Intreſt of the Rebells only, whence the rupture in England will be wider, and more to their ruyn, for there by all the greivances for want of Trade in England, and oppreſſions to maintaine their warr will becaſt on the true cauſers, and the people of England will lay hold on the advantage preſented for their releaſe, whereas at preſent many Engliſh have a great animoſity againſt the Dutch for not declaring for the *King*, having ſo cleere an occaſion, and they interpret it as a diſaffection to the *King* and the Engliſh Nation, now languiſhing under a ſore oppreſſion, and the Dutch only ſeeke how to ſerve themſelves without conſideration, or ſenſe of their ſad ſufferings. If the *Kings* cauſe were owned by them, many, aſwell Sea-men, as others in His three Kingdomes, would imploy themſelves on the Seas to make prize of the trading Engliſh, which now they doe not in regard of the doubt they have of the intention of theſe Countryes for the King, and there would there upon follow a great want of Sea-men in England, and ſuch, as ſerved, would beſuſpected by them, and not without cauſe: And the loſſes the Engliſh would ſuſtaine by ſuch Engliſh Sea-men, and others, as would imploy themſelves in ſhipps of warr, would be greater then the Fleets ſet out of Holland doth them. The aſſiſtance from forreigne Princes would be better procured, & more ſurely retained, for they are more ſenſible of the perfidious proceedings of the

Rebells againſt their *King* and Countrey, then of the loſſes of the Dutch, and they are doubtfull to embarque themſelves in a warr with the Dutch, when they profeſſe no other end then *Retorſion* for their loſſes, which is no other, then Letters of Repriſall, and will not beleeve, that the United Provinces have a thorow reſolution to make warr againſt the Rebells in England, untill they ſhall ſee that the *King* of England be taken in by them, whoſe Intereſt is ſo very neceſſary to the good ſucceſſe of that warr: and moſt Princes will ſooner be invited before the Dutch have received a loſſe then after, and the Dutch danger is greater in a loſſe, then their advantage in a Victory; The one being a ruin to their Trade: The other not a full ſecurity: And moſt men conclude from the not declaring for the *King*, that the Dutch will be content to have peace, even on very hard conditions, while the *King* is not owned, nor ſuch Alliances made as might remonſtrate they intended to try the event of a warr. The Rebells of England likewiſe make the ſame collections from the forbearance of the States of the Netherlands to take in the *King* into their quarrell, and take it to be a feare to provoke them too farr, or a feare, that the *King* may prejudice their affaires. For the firſt, the Dutch, in all reaſon, ought to remove that conceite, for there cannot be a greater encouragement to an Ennemy, then to know, that his Ennemy feares him, whence their Souldiers take heart, and ſuch as love them not, who are in power, for feare dare not now profeſſe, or act againſt them. It cannot be expected, that any ſtrangers ſhould ſo Paſſionately enter into a warr againſt thoſe Rebells upon the Injuries they have done the Netherlands, as upon the horrid Regicide and many Murthers, Barbariſmes, and vaillaines that they have acted to gaine their power, which hath made them odious to all good Chriſtians and honeſt men: And it muſt needes prove a violent motive to any to act in a warr, when the impieties of the Ennemy are more prevalent then private Intereſt. Many of thoſe in the very Provinces themſelves, that fighte in the warr, being not ſo ſenſible of the loſſes of others, that have been robbed by the Rebells, as of the wickednes they have committed at home. And if the *States* declare for the *King*, it may be reaſonably preſumed, that no Prince or State will aſſiſt ſuch odious Rebells againſt them, ſo as they wil be the declared Ennemyes of mankinde. Such Engliſh, as have a deſire to aſſiſt the Dutch againſt thoſe Rebells are loath to adventure themſelves, when they apprehend they advance not the cauſe of the *King*, nor contribute to the ruin of the Rebells, but only to a

pacification of the hostility begun betweene the two Nations, which will render the condition of the English more miserable. It is not unknowne to the Rebells, how great a party is still in heart for the *King* in the three Kingdomes, nor to others by what means these Rebells seeke to destroy them. And the consideration of the Royall party, being by farr the most numerous in the three Kingdomes, is a great cause why the Rebells must have a warr, and thence it must follow, that their Ennemies must seeke to make the best advantage of that party, which will be oppressed by the Rebells during the warr, and be useles to those, that have warrs with them, while they declare not for the *King's* Right, which that party desires only to maintaine. And though the readines of the *King's* party to rise did not appeare at his Maj. last coming into England out of Scotland, that was not for want of will, they being surprized by the *King's* sudden, and unexpected coming, whereof they had not notice till the Rebells had formed their army, placed guards in all places, and imprisoned all the principall Persons they suspected to be well affected to his MAJESTY. I shall not offer the motives of Religion, which as it inclined Queen ELIZABETH to the succour of the United Provinces, ought not to be neglected to the *King* against the most scandalous Sectaries, hipocriticall Traytours, and bloody murtherers, that any age hath produced. Nor those of honour, that those Countries apprehended the opportunity of reinvesting the King, and destroying the Rebells, & were the first declared Enemies of them upon that ground. The profit is very evident by what hath byn said with this addition; that if they take in the Kings cause, there is likely to be a speedy end of the warr, and all Princes, that have an Intereſt in the preservation of the United Provinces, must heartily engage in their assistance, where at present there is scare hope of the end of a warr, and a peace would be but a snare, when on the one side its like to hold no longer then the first opportunity offers advantage in the breach of it, and would prove as ruinous as a warr could be expected. Those Countryes have the experience of the principles of falshood, and infidelity that these Rebells steere by, that there is no dependance on any promises, or Leagues they make, they considering only their owne advantages: And if they offer to treate for peace, it is only to ly in waite to surprize those they treate with, and to make them unprovided by omitting needefull preparations, or seasonable enterprizes, or losing profitable Alliances for their support. And it were an indelible infamy, if these

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Provinces should cast themselves into the subjection of those execrable Rebells, who will never treate with them onbetter termes, nor thinke themselves secure in any peace with them without the possession of cautionary Townes. It were not reasonable that the King should make known the waies of attaining his rights, or the use he can make of his Loyall subjects if an occasion were offred, untill his Interest be taken into the warr, for that were to make all meanes fruiteles, and to betray his cause, and friends to the Enemy: But it may easily finde credit, when so great a part of his Kingdomes are affected to him, that there cannot want many waies, & advantages to weaken the Rebells power, and give an entrance to his right, and the peace of these Countries by the helpe of his Allies; And there can be no apprehension of danger from taking in the King, neither to the publique, nor private persons, who may be confident of Iustice, and gratitude from him: it being a rare Example, if any Prince or his posterity hath ever forgotten so great an obligation to those, that have restored him; And they connot thinke, that he wilbe a cause to undermine, or subject that State, that endeavour to advance his, Neyther can it consist with his honour, and Interest to disunite them, or set up parties against one another. It must be his endeavour to reconcile all differences among that people, that assist him, it being the worke of his Enemies to create jealosies; and disaffections beetwene his frinds. And such as prefer the preservation of domesticke wellfare in their States before kindnelies to friends, or detestation of bloody usurpers, must conceive the same consideration in the King to set his owne Interest before any personall respects: And no jealosy can feare that from him, which will not certenly be acted by his Rebells, if he be not restored. Thus have I breifely delivered you what I apprehend of the present condition of this warr: and I am the more confident, that I am not swayed by Interest, or partiality, finding most men of different nations, and uningaged concurr in the Conclusion. That nothing can render the warr so short, not the Netherlands so strong, and safe, as the speedy ioyning in the cause of the King of England.

FINIS